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The Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Idea of Communist Society 
David James 
 
The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity 
[Not] and external expediency [äußere Zweckmäßigkeit] ends; it lies by its very 
nature beyond the sphere of material production proper. Just as the savage must 
wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so 
must civilized man, and he must do so in all forms of society and under all 
possible modes of production. This realm of natural necessity 
[Naturnotwendigkeit] expands with his development, because his needs do too; 
but the productive forces to satisfy these expand at the same time. Freedom, in 
this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated 
producers, govern the human metabolism [Stoffwechsel] with nature in a 
rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being 
dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of 
energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. 
But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, the 
development of human powers as an end in itself [als Selbstzweck], begins 
beyond it, though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis. 
The reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite. (Marx and Engels 
1956-1990: 25, 828; Marx 1991: 958-959) 
 
In this well-known passage from the third volume of Capital, Marx opposes the ‘true realm of 
freedom’ to the ‘realm of necessity’. In the latter human beings are subject to constraints that 
are generated by their having to labour to satisfy material needs. This gives rise to a practical 
form of necessity which consists in having to do something independently of what one desires 
to do. This opposition between freedom and necessity applies to modern industrial societies, 
because the restricted, mechanical nature of the forms of labour performed by many people in 
these societies make it difficult to see how individuals would choose to work in the absence of 
ends that are external to the act of working itself, thereby reducing this act to a means to an 
end. The fact that Marx himself views labour that is necessary when it comes to satisfying 
society’s material needs as incompatible with genuine freedom, is suggested by his claim that 
the shortening of the working day is the basic condition of the true realm of freedom which has 
the realm of material necessity as its basis.  
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The opposition between the freedom that individuals enjoy outside work and the 
necessity of labour has generated discussion concerning the precise nature of this opposition 
and whether the passage from the third volume of Capital quoted above shows that Marx’s 
views on labour underwent a fundamental change.1 As we shall see, in his early writings Marx 
characterizes work that individuals are compelled to perform as alienated labour, and he 
contrasts this type of labour with a situation in which ‘man produces even when he is free from 
physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need’ (Marx and Engels 1956-
1990: 40, 517; Marx 1992: 329). When read in conjunction with the passage from the third 
volume of Capital, this statement implies that human beings produce things in a genuinely free 
manner only when they do not have to work to satisfy their material needs. It appears, then, 
that alienated labour would continue to exist in communist society simply in virtue of the fact 
that human beings must continue to labour to satisfy such needs. Yet, as we shall see, some of 
Marx’s claims concerning labour in his early writings indicate that it is only under certain 
conditions that labour aimed at meeting material needs must be viewed as essentially unfree, 
so that the fact that labour is socially necessary does not by itself exclude the possibility of 
freedom. Moreover, in the later Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx claims that in a higher 
phase of communist society labour becomes ‘not merely a means to live but the foremost need 
in life’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 19, 21; Marx 1996: 214). Here the act of working appears 
to possess an intrinsic value, and there is no suggestion, therefore, that work performed as a 
matter of material necessity must lack such value. I shall argue that this intrinsic value has in 
part to do with how, for Marx, freedom and necessity can, under the right conditions, be made 
compatible, even if the fact of having to work to meet society’s material needs limits the extent 
to which freedom is possible within the sphere of material production.   
It has been argued that for Marx even ‘necessary’ labour in  the sphere of material 
production can be a free and self-realizing activity under the right conditions because human 
practical activity, unlike the instinctive behaviour of non-human animals, is always to some 
extent free activity (Sayers 2011: 65-69). Simply working on an object, irrespective of the 
particular form of labour involved, in this respect necessarily represents a manifestation of 
freedom compared to the act of merely consuming an object. This argument has the virtue of 
making sense of Marx’s claim that even in the realm of necessity there is some freedom. Yet it 
is susceptible to the criticism that one could grant that human labour, whatever its particular 
form, is essentially different from the instinctive behaviour of non-human animals, but also 
claim that the difference in question is not so great in the case of certain forms of labour to 
warrant speaking of degrees of freedom rather than degrees of necessity. In other words, 
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although human beings are free in the sense of not obeying instinct alone, they must still be 
thought to work as a matter of necessity alone, in the sense that they would not work if other 
options were available, because for them the act of working, even in communist society, lacks 
any intrinsic value.  
For Marx, it is impossible for there to be a society and mode of production that did not 
require human interaction with nature whose aim is to satisfy materials needs. He accordingly 
describes this type of labour as ‘an eternal natural necessity’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 
57; Marx 1990: 133). This necessity increases with the expansion of needs, which is itself 
determined by developments in the means of production. This is not the only way in which 
there arises the possibility of major historical differences in the way in which human beings 
are subject to natural necessity, since the production process can be organized in fundamentally 
different ways, as has indeed happened in the course of human history. I shall argue that the 
claim that labour which aims to satisfy material needs can nevertheless be a free and self-
realizing activity under the conditions established in communist society requires understanding 
the compatibility of freedom and necessity in a way that does not demand treating human 
labour as such as being intrinsically free. The compatibility that Marx has in mind instead 
concerns the idea of socialized human beings, as ‘the associated producers’, regulating material 
production in a rational way so as to bring both nature and the productive forces under their 
collective control and thereby avoid being dominated by a blind power. Essentially, it is the 
way in which production is organized by the workers themselves, rather than the activity of 
working taken by itself, that allows some room for freedom in the realm of necessity, and thus 
the possibility of working in conditions that are the most appropriate to, and worthy of, human 
nature. This interpretation of how freedom and necessity are compatible in the ‘realm of 
necessity’ will also provide the means of understanding how the act of working can in the realm 
of necessity possess an intrinsic value, albeit of a limited kind.  
In this way, I demonstrate that two plausible ways of explaining the difference between 
freedom in the ‘realm of necessity’ and freedom in the ‘true’ realm of freedom as presented in 
the third volume of Capital rely on distinctions that are ultimately too clear-cut. The first way 
is to argue that the freedom enjoyed in the realm of necessity concerns collective self-
determination understood in a broadly Kantian way, whereas the more complete freedom that 
individuals enjoy beyond the sphere of material production concerns self-realization 
understood in a broadly Aristotelian way (Kandiyali 2014: 108-110). The second way of 
explaining the difference between the realm of necessity and the realm of true freedom is to 
argue that within the former work, although not worthless, is not an end in itself, that is to say, 
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it lacks any intrinsic value, whereas in the true realm of freedom individuals engage in activities 
that are ends in themselves (Klagge 1986). I shall argue (1) that although collective self-
determination is indeed a characteristic feature of the realm of necessity in communist society, 
self-realization is, to some extent, also a characteristic feature of it, and (2) that although work 
has an instrumental value in the realm of necessity, it may to some extent also possess an 
intrinsic value, and, what is more, in virtue of how it allows individuals to realize themselves, 
if only in a limited way. It is not, therefore, a matter of either collective self-determination or 
individual self-realization, either engagement in activities that have only a purely instrumental 
value or engagement in activities that possess an intrinsic value. Rather, self-determination and 
self-realization, instrumental value and intrinsic value, are to varying degrees all present in the 
realm of necessity as it would be in communist society. Moreover, I shall indicate one good 
reason that Marx has for not wanting to distinguish the realm of necessity from the true realm 
of freedom in a way that would exclude self-realization and intrinsic value from the first of 
these realms.  
Admittedly, the two positions mentioned above command some strong textual support 
in the passage from the third volume of Capital quoted earlier. Marx states that the realm of 
freedom ‘by its very nature’ (der Natur der Sache nach) lies beyond the sphere of material 
production and thus beyond the realm of necessity. This implies the existence of an essential 
qualitative difference that the distinction between collective self-determination and individual 
self-realization promises to capture. Marx also states that the development of human powers 
‘as an end in itself’ characterizes the true realm of freedom. This suggests that it is only beyond 
the realm of necessity that human beings engage in activities that possess an intrinsic value.  
Given that the term ‘freedom’ can signify different things, however, and that Marx allows that 
freedom of some kind is possible in the realm of necessity, we must ask what Marx actually 
means by the term ‘freedom’ in each case. In particular, we need to ask whether he treats the 
realm of necessity and the realm of true freedom as separate spheres in virtue of how they 
involve essentially different types of freedom, or whether he regards the second realm as 
exhibiting to a greater extent than the first one the same type of freedom as the freedom that 
human beings begin to enjoy in the realm of necessity.  
I shall argue that, despite his claim that the realm of freedom ‘by its very nature’ lies 
beyond the sphere of material production, Marx can, in fact, be seen to adopt the second 
position. This is because he operates with a concept of freedom that incorporates various 
aspects of freedom, each of which can be present to a greater or lesser degree. This concept of 
freedom cannot be reduced to any of its constituent parts. A condition in which freedom is 
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present, as Marx claims it is even in the realm of necessity in communist society, must therefore 
to some extent embody all the aspects of this concept of freedom. Thus it is not, strictly 
speaking, a matter of a hierarchy of different types of freedom, even if one aspect of freedom 
is lower in the sense of being a condition of the exercise of another one. This will in turn enable 
me to argue that the realm of necessity in communist society is not one in which self-
determination exists while self-realization is absent, nor one in which human activity lacks any 
intrinsic value.  Thus reading the passage from the third volume of Capital quoted earlier in 
the light of Marx’s idea of freedom paves the way for a more nuanced view of the difference 
between freedom in the realm of necessity, as it will be in communist society, and freedom in 
the realm of true freedom. I shall accordingly begin with an attempt to reconstruct Marx’s 
account of freedom and then go on to relate it to the constraints generated by the fact of having 
to labour to satisfy material needs as encountered in capitalist society. This will provide the 
basis of my discussion of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society.  
 
Marx on Freedom and Constraint in Capitalist Society 
Marx’s account of freedom is complex and it must in large part be reconstructed on the basis 
of what he says about other concepts or phenomena. I shall identify three interrelated types of 
freedom that are central to Marx’s critique of capitalism, from which his concept of freedom 
can be gleaned:  
 
(1) Negative freedom understood as the absence of constraints in an obvious sense, as 
with physical force exercised by a stronger party in relation to a weaker one, or as the 
absence of constraints that in effect compel human beings to do something 
independently of what they desire to do and what they would choose to do if other 
options were available to them. 
 
(2) An expressive form of freedom which is negative in nature in so far as it consists in 
encountering no obstacles to the exercise and development of certain distinctively 
human capacities through practical engagement with the world on the part of 
individuals acting alone or in association with others. At the same time, however, this 
expressive freedom has a positive dimension, in that human beings are thereby able to 
realize the potential which comes from their possession of these capacities. As we shall 
see, these capacities can be identified with the capacities associated with free agency in 
particular.2 If an individual is conscious of his or her possession of these capacities, he 
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or she is likely to experience a sense of frustration when encountering obstacles to their 
exercise and development. Yet even if an individual is not conscious of possessing these 
capacities, as may well happen if he or she lacks the opportunity to exercise and thereby 
develop them, we can speak of a waste of human potential that is likely to generate a 
sense of frustration, even if the grounds of this sense of frustration remain opaque to 
the individual who experiences it. For Marx, alienated labour is a form of activity that 
does not allow for the exercise and development of essential human capacities, and for 
this reason he describes it as a form of activity that is ‘wholly alien to itself, to man and 
to nature, and hence to consciousness and the expression of life [Lebensäußerung]’ 
(Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 524; Marx 1992: 336; translation modified)  
 
(3) Autonomy in the specific sense captured by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his 
description of ‘moral’ freedom as that which ‘alone makes man truly the master of 
himself; for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has 
prescribed to oneself is freedom’ (Rousseau 1997: 54). 
 
Although freedom in senses (1) and (2) imply that freedom and constraint are incompatible, 
this is not the case with freedom in sense (3). Absence of constraint is, nevertheless, a condition 
of autonomy, for one could not act autonomously if one’s actions were determined by purely 
external constraints. Moreover, as we shall see, self-realization in the sphere of material 
production in communist society, and thus freedom in sense (2), is for Marx essentially 
connected with the exercise of autonomy. Indeed, there is an internal connection between self-
realization and self-determination, and thus between expressive freedom and autonomy, both 
here and in the ‘true’ realm of freedom, in that the capacity for self-determination is an 
essentially human one whose exercise is, therefore, key to how human beings are able to realize 
themselves and their human nature. Given this internal connection between self-realization and 
self-determination, we can already see how there might be a problem with the claim that self-
determination is possible in the realm of necessity while self-realization belongs to the true 
realm of freedom that lies beyond the sphere of material production. Rather, any effective 
exercise of the capacity for self-determination will be accompanied by a corresponding degree 
of self-realization. 
To the extent that the constraints to which individuals are subject can be viewed as 
products of self-determination, expressive freedom is also compatible with the existence of 
constraints, rather than being something that demands the absence of constraint altogether. In 
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fact, expressive freedom requires both negative freedom and autonomy, because the 
opportunity to develop and objectify essential human capacities requires not only the absence 
of obstacles to their exercise and development but also control over the conditions under which 
these capacities are exercised. Among these conditions we can include the opportunity to 
determine what these conditions are, and the act of determining this matter will itself represent 
an exercise of autonomy, and thus an instance of self-realization. Autonomy or self-
determination would not be possible, however, if an agent’s actions were determined by factors 
that are wholly independent of his or her own will, and this form of freedom therefore requires 
negative freedom in the broad sense of the absence of purely external constraints. In this respect 
expressive freedom unites negative freedom and moral freedom, resulting in a single concept 
of freedom that contains within itself all the three aspects of freedom identified above. 
As we shall see, the negative aspect of Marx’s account of freedom specifically concerns 
the absence of constraints whose ultimate source can be located in economic and social forces 
that are independent of the wills of individuals and even the will of society as a whole, or, to 
be more precise, are believed to be so. These forces exhibit law-like regularities, and in this 
respect they can be treated as the manifestations of certain quasi-natural laws. Marx himself 
alludes to the idea that economic forces exhibit the type of necessity associated with natural 
laws when he speaks of tendencies, whose basis is found in the laws of capitalist production, 
as ‘winning their way through and working themselves out with iron necessity’ (Marx and 
Engels 1956-1990, 23, 12; Marx 1990: 91). The idea that economic and social forces exhibit a 
quasi-natural necessity can also be detected in Marx’s criticisms of the way in which ‘vulgar’ 
political economy treats, in an ideological manner, historically contingent economic or social 
forms as naturally given. He claims, for example, that the so-called trinity formula, which 
consists of the factors of production – capital, land and labour - together with their respective 
forms of revenue - interest, rent and wages - as understood by such economic thinking, 
‘corresponds to the self-interest of the dominant classes, since it preaches the natural necessity 
and perpetual justification of their sources of income and erects this into a dogma’ (Marx and 
Engels 1956-1990: 25, 838-839; Marx 1991: 969). Here it is implied that the necessity in 
question is in fact illusory. These economic categories and phenomena are necessary only in 
relation to the workings of a particular economic system, and the possibility of abolishing this 
system reveals their essentially contingent nature. In other words, economic and social 
categories and phenomena may well be necessary in relation to the system to which they belong 
at the same time as they are contingent in virtue of the contingency of the same economic and 
social system. There are people, however, who have an interest in the continued existence of a 
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particular economic and social system, leading them to present it and its fundamental categories 
as something natural to which human thought and agency must simply accommodate 
themselves. The impersonal forces that govern such a system generate constraints that are so 
restrictive that in effect they determine the will of any agent that is subject to them, whether 
this agent be an individual or a social class. These practical constraints, which are not identical 
with the impersonal economic and social forces that are their source, may be explicit ones, such 
as legal constraints that function to stabilize and maintain an economic and social system over 
time. These constraints may, however, equally possess an informal character that can be 
explained in terms of interpersonal or intergroup relations based on differences in economic 
and social power. As we shall shortly see, Marx himself is especially interested in informal 
constraints that are connected with differences in bargaining power in a free market.  
Marx’s understanding of how individuals are subject to constraints imposed upon them 
by the capitalist mode of production is evident from his description of work that one is 
compelled to perform – he himself speaks of labour that is ‘not voluntary [freiwillig] but … 
forced labour [Zwangsarbeit]’ - as alienated labour, and from how at the same time he speaks 
of work as ‘not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself’ (Marx 
and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 514; Marx 1992: 326). In other words, the act of working is 
‘external’ to the worker, even though it is the worker’s own act, in the sense that he or she 
works simply to survive, whereas no human being in such a situation would, or so it is assumed, 
willingly work in such circumstances if another meaningful option were available to him or 
her. The act of working therefore lacks the intrinsic value it would possess if individuals were 
to engage in this act for its own sake. Instead, the worker engages in productive activity only 
as a matter of necessity, whereas ‘as soon as no physical or other compulsion [Zwang] exists it 
is shunned like the plague’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 514; Marx 1992: 326). In this 
case, however, the only other option is starvation, and Marx clearly rejects the notion that 
something can be ‘voluntary’ simply in virtue of being chosen on the basis of a desire that one 
happens to have, and which in this case would be the desire for self-preservation.3  
If the brute fact that the desire on which an agent acts is that agent’s own desire is not 
sufficient to class an act as a voluntary one, the following question arises: what are the other 
conditions of voluntary action? We may assume that these conditions include the availability 
of other meaningful options when it comes to satisfying a desire that one has, unless, as with a 
desire for purely luxury goods, the desire is of such a kind that having to forego its satisfaction 
in the face of a lack of acceptable options would not result in a fundamental human interest 
being harmed. 4 None of this requires, however, the absence of any antecedent cause which 
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determines the will, or that the available options are extensive both in terms of number and in 
terms of range, a requirement that may, in fact, end up reducing actual choice to a purely 
arbitrary matter. The requirement is only that an agent’s choices are not constrained to the point 
that there are no other meaningful options available to him or her when it comes to pursuing a 
fundamental human interest, including the end of securing the material conditions of life as 
determined by a particular stage of historical development. Although the pursuit of this end is 
incompatible with freedom when an individual has no choice but to work, given the absence 
of other meaningful options, this is not to say that this end cannot figure at all among the 
reasons that an agent has for working in cases where freedom is possible. 
This negative freedom, which consists in the absence of objective conditions that 
constrain an agent’s will  because they result in no other meaningful options being available to 
him or her, has an instrumental value in relation to the expressive freedom described earlier. 
The importance of this expressive freedom is evident from certain features of Marx’s account 
of alienation, which is based on the idea of a subject-object relation that represents an essential 
feature of all productive activity. The object is the product of labour, and this can broadly 
speaking be taken to mean any perceivable change or state of affairs brought about in the world 
by means of human labour (Wood 2004: 39). When the subject is able to identify itself with the 
object of its labour, and in this sense recognize itself in this object despite the object’s 
independence, we have a type of self-objectification. For Marx, genuine self-objectification 
can be achieved only when the subject, through his or her productive activity, gives objective 
expression to essentially human capacities that would have otherwise remained latent, such as 
the power to conceive of an object in purely mental terms and then to give objective existence 
to this mental representation (Vorstellung) by means of one’s own productive activity (Marx 
and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 193; Marx 1990: 285). In this way, an individual’s conscious, 
purposeful activity and the results of this activity produce an external confirmation of his or 
her human essence. At the same time, he or she is able to realize him- or herself in the sense of 
exercising and developing certain powers associated with this essence by means of conscious 
activity which is free in the sense that it is performed in accordance with ends which the agent 
has formed and chooses to realize through its own activity. This self-objectification and self-
realization is not possible, however, for workers in capitalist society. The following reason that 
Marx gives for this impossibility is especially relevant to his account of the possibility of 
freedom in the ‘realm of necessity’: ‘the object that labour produces, its product, stands 
opposed to it as an alien being [fremdes Wesen], as a power independent of the producer’ (Marx 
and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 511; Marx 1992: 324; translation modified).  
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This statement tells us that alienation occurs when that which the worker produces has 
an alien appearance and operates as a power that has become wholly independent of its creator. 
The alien appearance that the object assumes in relation to the individual who produced it is 
not simply the result of how the object now stands opposed to its creator in the literal sense of 
existing in separation from the worker in space and time. As we have seen, this state of affairs 
does not by itself exclude the possibility of self-objectification and self-realization. Marx 
claims that labour ‘is external to the worker, i.e. does not belong to his essential being [Wesen]; 
that he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and 
not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins 
his mind’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 514; Marx 1992: 326). We have already seen how 
labour is external to the worker in the sense that it is reduced to a means to an end and therefore 
lacks intrinsic value. Here labour is ‘external’ in a different figurative sense, namely, that it is 
not expressive of what an agent essentially is, that is to say, a being that is capable of exercising 
and developing its mental and physical powers by means of  conscious purposive activity. 
Moreover, we have a situation in which the external nature of the object, in the sense of its 
independent existence as an object that is perceivable through the senses, is made into an 
independent power that dominates its creator:  
 
The externalization of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes 
an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently of him and 
alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; that the life which 
he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien. (Marx and Engels 
1956-1990: 40, 512; Marx 1992: 324)  
 
In relation to the way in which the object has become purely ‘external’, and thus ‘alien’, to the 
worker, I want to draw attention to a key point that concerns the relation of Marx’s explanation 
of the alienation that is an inevitable feature of the capitalist mode of production to the negative 
freedom described earlier. This point has to do with how the situation in question is ultimately 
to be explained in terms of the worker’s lack of control over the production process and the 
activities that he or she performs within this process, thereby making him or her into a passive 
victim of constraints that are generated by economic and social forces that operate 
independently of his or her own will.  
The most immediate explanation of this lack of control is that the object does not belong 
to the worker. It is instead the private property of the capitalist who owns the means of 
11 
 
 
production, provides the materials upon which the worker labours and purchases the worker’s 
labour-power for a specified period of time, during which time the capitalist is entitled to 
determine what the worker does. This state of affairs explains such manifestations of the 
alienation suffered by the worker as his or her complete indifference towards the product of his 
or her labour. The worker could, in fact, be producing absolutely anything, so long as it earns 
him or her a wage. Then there is the worker’s alienation in relation to his or her own productive 
activity. The lack of control over his or her productive activity means that this activity, unless 
by some improbable happy coincidence, will not be an expression of the worker’s own ideas 
and projects. This lack of control must itself, however, be explained in terms of the constraints 
generated by impersonal economic and social forces over which even the individual capitalist 
has no control, as Marx himself emphasizes when he states that, ‘Under free competition, the 
immanent laws of capitalist production are made to confront the individual capitalist as an 
external coercive law [äußerliches Zwangsgesetz]’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 286; 
Marx 1990: 381; translation modified). The situation is nevertheless worse for the worker 
because he or she is compelled, through his or her productive activity, to contribute to the 
creation and maintenance of the same forces that dominate him or her. What he or she produces 
enters the market as a commodity which, like all commodities, is produced with a view to its 
exchange value, and which, once sold, facilitates the expansion of capital and thus an increase 
in the power of capital over labour. In this way, the worker ‘necessarily impoverishes himself 
… because the creative power of his labour establishes itself as the power of capital, as an alien 
power confronting him’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 42, 228; Marx 1993: 307).  
The worker is essentially unfree in capitalist society, then, not only because he or she 
lacks the opportunity for genuine creative and expressive activity in the workplace, but also 
because he or she is dominated by impersonal economic and social forces which he or she helps 
produce and maintain through his or her productive activity but cannot control. Rather, these 
forces are the source of constraints that make the enjoyment of expressive freedom virtually 
impossible for him or her. Gaining control of these forces would, in contrast, open up the 
possibility of creative and expressive acts that are performed within the production process 
itself, making the worker’s productive activity and the results of this activity less ‘external’ or 
‘alien’ to him or her, allowing self-realization to accompany the exercise of self-determination. 
Labour might then come to possess an intrinsic value as opposed to being nothing more than 
the means to end that is independent of it. This is because in these conditions the agent 
concerned may come to find the activity of working to be in itself fulfilling and rewarding 
because it involves the exercise of distinctively human capacities, whose development is not 
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possible independently of the act of exercising them. It is not the case, therefore, that, once 
achieved, it would be possible subsequently to enjoy the good in question after one had ceased 
to engage in activities that require the exercise of such capacities, as happens when an activity 
serves merely as the means of attaining a given end that is external to the activity itself. Thus, 
we can already begin to see how collective self-determination and individual self-realization 
might both be possible even in the realm of necessity. Control of the production process would, 
moreover, represent a condition of the negative freedom that consists in the absence of the type 
of constraint that explains the alienation suffered by workers in capitalist society, for by 
determining the conditions under which they labour, the workers would be able to remove this 
type of constraint, even if the constraints generated by the necessity of working to satisfy 
material needs would remain. Consequently, we can also begin to see how all three aspects of 
Marx’s concept of freedom might be present in communist society in so far as the realm of 
necessity persists within this form of society. 
The objection might here be made that Marx’s negative account of freedom 
illegitimately extends the notion of what would count as a constraint on freedom. This would 
only be the case, however, if negative freedom is defined as the absence of forms of coercion 
that consist in deliberate interference with the activity or lives of others, and thus entail the 
existence of a conscious agent that engages in such acts of interference.5 Marx has good reasons 
for extending the notion of constraint to include constraints generated by impersonal economic 
and social forces, even though conscious agency cannot be plausibly attributed to these forces 
themselves. First of all, as I have already pointed out, the practical constraints generated by 
impersonal economic and social forces that exhibit (or are held to exhibit) a quasi-natural 
lawfulness are logically distinct from these forces themselves, and it is the absence of these 
constraints that matters. Nevertheless, regulating or abolishing these impersonal economic and 
social forces would be a condition of removing the constraints that they generate. This in turn 
makes it possible to talk of human intentions in relation to these constraints, even if, as is the 
case here, that which constrains the will of an agent is explained in terms of the workings of an 
impersonal economic and social system. For despite the difficulties involved in identifying a 
particular conscious agent that deliberately coerces others or interferes with their lives in some 
other way, individuals or social classes may nevertheless indirectly function as such an agent 
by consciously intending the existence or persistence of a particular economic and social 
system, or one or more of its fundamental conditions, such as a state of affairs in which some 
people have no choice but to sell their labour cheaply because of their lack of economic and 
social power. This would not require a conscious plan and careful coordination of individual 
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agents’ actions with the aim of putting into effect such a plan, and nor does the element of 
intentional action need to be identified with state action in particular.6 Rather, it could be that 
shared class interests are sufficient to generate common objectives together with informal 
patterns of cooperation and coordination of actions that aim to realize these objectives. 
Members of the capitalist class may then be thought to act in accordance with a common but 
informal policy with the intention of stabilizing and preserving the capitalist economic and 
social system without, however, intending that proletarian agent a is prevented by constraint x 
from doing y. This policy may be one that this class pursues in association with others, such as 
the proponents of ‘vulgar’ political economy who, as we have seen, present historically 
contingent economic categories and relations as something natural to which human thought 
and agency must accommodate themselves. In pursuing a policy of encouraging widespread 
acceptance of an economic and social system that favours their interests, and in making others 
think that they are powerless to change this system, let alone abolish it, the members of this 
class and their defenders nevertheless intend that the proletariat as a class is prevented from 
doing, or from thinking it is able to do, certain things.7 There would then be a causal connection 
between that which an individual or collective agent intends and a state of affairs in which 
other agents are subject to constraints in a way that allows one to claim that their lives are 
interfered with in ways that are incompatible with one or more of their fundamental interests.  
If, as I have argued, the workers’ lack of control over what they do to secure the basic 
material conditions of life and human activity generates constraints that are incompatible with 
freedom even in the negative sense, gaining control over what they do will be a condition of 
this negative freedom as well as a condition of expressive freedom. Given that having control 
over what one does implies the capacity to determine what one does and how one does it, 
freedom in the negative freedom would ultimately depend on the exercise of moral freedom, 
as described by Rousseau, or what we would call autonomy. I shall now argue that the 
compatibility of freedom and necessity mentioned in the passage from the third volume of 
Capital quoted at the beginning of this essay can only be fully explained in terms of the crucial, 
if largely implicit, role played by the notion of autonomy or self-determination,8 and how all 
three aspects of Marx’s concept of freedom are to some extent present in the ‘realm of 
necessity’. The compatibility of freedom and necessity cannot, therefore, be explained 
independently of the idea of a condition in which socialized human beings regulate their 
interchange with nature in a rational way, so as not to be dominated by ‘a blind power’, and so 
as to labour in conditions that are ‘most worthy and appropriate for their human nature’, in the 
sense that these conditions allow individuals to work freely and thereby realize their human 
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essence in the production process. This will in turn allow us to think of the realm of necessity 
as a sphere in which human labour to some extent possesses an intrinsic value. 
 
The Compatibility of Freedom and Constraint in the Realm of Necessity 
Rousseau’s claim that moral freedom ‘alone makes man truly the master of himself; for the 
impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself 
is freedom’ points to the existence of a form of freedom whose essential character is as follows. 
Acting in accordance with brute desires is considered to be the opposite of genuine freedom 
because human beings would then simply obey given natural impulses and would not, therefore, 
engage in any act of willing at all. To will something human beings must exercise some degree 
of self-mastery. This requires exercising some degree of effective control over themselves, so 
that they are no longer at the mercy of immediate impulses that determine them to act in a 
purely instinctual manner. Rather, given their capacity to achieve a reflective distance between 
themselves and their given desires, human beings can evaluate their desires and, on the basis 
of their evaluation of them, choose whether or not to allow them to determine their actions. 
This capacity to evaluate given desires makes it possible to engage in acts of willing in 
accordance with some higher-order principle that an agent has adopted, enabling human beings 
to impose principles of action upon themselves. Freedom and constraint are compatible, then, 
in the sense that an agent is subject to restrictions whose source lies wholly or in large measure 
in the will of the agent. This conception of moral freedom is implicit in some of Marx’s key 
claims and concepts, especially his notion of species-being (Gattungswesen), which he 
describes as follows: 
 
Man is a species-being, not only because he practically and theoretically makes the 
species – both his own and those of other things – his object, but also – and this is 
simply another way of saying the same thing – because he looks upon himself as the 
present, living species, because he looks upon himself as a universal and therefore free 
being. (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 515; Marx 1992: 327)  
 
I take this to mean that the capacity to become conscious of the defining attributes of the human 
species, as well as those of other species, is itself an essential human attribute. This capacity 
makes it possible for human beings to reflect on the nature of all their other essential attributes 
and to act in accordance with these attributes that form part of their conception of the human 
essence. Acting in accordance with their conception of the human essence requires interaction 
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with the material world confronting human beings, including the other species whose nature 
human beings are able to comprehend, thereby providing them with a theoretical knowledge 
which can aid their practical engagement with the material world. In so far as human beings 
act in their present historical situation according to the conception of the human essence that 
provides the standard in accordance with which they judge their own actions and the actions of 
others, they think and act as a ‘universal’ in the sense of having what is common to humankind 
as the object of their thoughts and actions. Human beings may think and act, in short, in 
accordance with a normative conception of what it means to be and to act as a human being.  
The compulsion to work that exists in capitalist society is alienating precisely because 
it is incompatible with the conscious, free activity that defines the human species. As we have 
seen, the laws of the market, to which individuals are made to accommodate their thoughts and 
actions, produce a situation in which people work only as a matter of natural necessity, that is, 
to satisfy the basic conditions of human survival, and in doing so, they become subject to other 
practical constraints. These constraints include a strict division of labour which makes manifest 
the alienation from other human beings that exists whenever the activity performed by 
labouring individuals is not understood by the agents themselves to form part of a conscious 
common project. Rather, each worker is restricted to the performance of a limited task, and he 
or she thereby becomes indifferent to the equally limited tasks performed by others in the 
production process, as well as being indifferent to whatever these others produce. It is in this 
context that Marx speaks of ‘forced’ labour. Consequently, he claims in The German Ideology 
that until now the union (Vereinigung) of individuals has not been the voluntary one whose 
basis is the arbitrary will and free choice of individuals (eine … willkürliche) described in 
Rousseau’s Social Contract, but, rather, a necessary one determined by the material conditions 
of human life and the division of labour, with the result that individuals are united by an ‘alien 
bond’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 3, 75; Marx and Engels 1974: 85-86).  
Part of what Marx means when he talks about this union based on necessity is, then, that with 
the capitalist mode of production and its division of labour individuals work together with 
others in order to survive and for no other reason. This invites the question of what would 
represent a genuinely voluntary form of association in the realm of necessity. Rousseau’s idea 
that moral freedom requires that individuals are subject to constraints that derive from their 
own wills and the way in which for him this freedom finds political expression in a situation 
in which individuals are the authors of the laws that they are obliged to obey provide some 
clues to Marx’s answer to this question. This answer can be viewed as an attempt to explain 
the compatibility of freedom and constraint in terms of laws that are self-imposed, provided 
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the term ‘law’ is taken in a sufficiently broad sense to mean something like a general rule of 
action.  
If the association of workers in communist society is to be a genuinely voluntary one, 
despite belonging to the realm of necessity, the constraints to which the members of this 
association are subject must in some sense be genuine products of their own wills. Now, in the 
case of material production, nature, as the given substrate of the workers’ activity, cannot be 
classed as a product of their own wills. The means of production could be classed as such, but 
only in the loose sense that tools and machines must first be invented and produced by human 
beings in the course of history. In capitalist society, however, these means of interacting with 
nature with a view to satisfying human needs confront individuals as a given, alien power that 
dominates them in the form of private property. Although socialization of the means of 
production in communist society might allow the means of production to lose their alien 
character in this sense, this would take us only so far, because for each individual worker the 
means of production would typically not be something that he or she has played an active role 
in producing, as is required by the idea that they are a product of his or her own will in the 
relevant sense. Rather, the workers will operate something that is already there and that in this 
respect confronts them as something given, if not as something entirely alien to them. Thus, it 
would be stretching the point to say that the constraints to which the workers are here subject, 
such as having to use a particular machine for a certain task or having to operate a machine in 
prescribed way, can be regarded as products of their own wills simply in virtue of the fact that 
the means of production are collectively owned.  
The workers could nevertheless agree among themselves how the production process 
should be organized and carried out with the given means at their disposal. This would include 
collectively deciding such matters as who does what and when, how long each person works 
each day, as well as other technical or practical matters that are not predetermined by the nature 
of the machinery employed or the task at hand, but instead demand the exercise of judgement, 
such as how long to keep a machine running or the best materials to use when different options 
exist, none of which is self-evidently preferable to another one. Another matter that might 
require deliberation on the part of the workers is the question of what to produce and in what 
quantity, given the existence of certain social needs and such factors as population size.9 In 
each case, that which the workers agree upon among themselves is likely to take the form of 
some kind of rule which each worker is subsequently obliged to obey. This allows us to speak 
of constraints to which individuals are subject that have their source in these individuals’ own 
wills, even though these constraints at the same time have a source which is independent of 
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their wills, in that the constraints in question must ultimately be explained in terms of the 
necessity to produce goods to satisfy society’s material needs.  
Marx allows, however, that any complex creative process involving the cooperation of 
many individuals may require a ‘governing will’ that provides a point of unification, and in 
this connection he employs the analogy of an orchestra that plays under a conductor (Direktor) 
(Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 25, 397; Marx 1991: 507). When applied to a workplace in which 
workers are subject to such a governing will, in addition to being subject to the type of united 
or ‘general’ will outlined above, this analogy might be thought to represent an unfortunate one, 
because conductors can exhibit authoritarian tendencies, while an orchestra could function 
without a conductor. Nevertheless, even in the case of a conductor who imposes his or her 
interpretation of a piece of music on an orchestra, the members of the orchestra may have 
agreed among themselves that this conductor is the one most likely to provide the best 
interpretation of a musical score, and that the orchestra can fulfil its full potential with this 
conductor at the helm rather than another one or without any conductor at all. The constraints 
that are generated by obedience to a governing will might then be regarded as something to 
which each individual engaged in this cooperative undertaking voluntarily subjects him- or 
herself. In this way, self-determination can be viewed as compatible with the existence of a 
governing will, whose authority ultimately derives from the united or ‘general’ will of the 
musicians or, by analogy, that of the workers.  
On the basis of what has already been argued, the compatibility of freedom and 
constraint in the realm of necessity amounts to a state of affairs in which each individual’s role 
in the production process has a voluntarist element which leaves room for the idea that the 
thoughts and actions of individuals are not determined by an alien power. Rather, the workers 
determine among themselves what their roles in the production process will be and other ways 
in which this process is to be organized. It would then also not be a matter of working simply 
in order to earn a wage that enables one to secure the means of subsistence as it is in capitalist 
society. Instead, by determining in association with others the conditions in and under which 
they labour, individuals are now in the position to exercise and develop certain distinctively 
human capacities, such as the capacity to deliberate and to engage in acts of self-direction. The 
exercise of these capacities might in turn explain how working comes to possess a value that 
is to some extent independent of the value it possesses in virtue of being a means of securing 
the basis material conditions of human existence both for oneself and for others. Engaging in 
acts deliberation and acts of self-direction might become needs in themselves when the 
performance of these acts is experienced as fulfilling in virtue of the fact that one thereby 
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realizes (if only partially) one’s human essence. There would then be an internal relation 
between the exercise and development of distinctively human capacities (self-realization) and 
the act of organizing production in association with others (self-determination), in so far as 
engaging in this act entails the exercise and development of these same capacities. To this 
extent, work would lose the purely instrumental character it possesses when someone works 
simply in order to survive.  
We here begin to see how work might become not merely a means to live but one of 
life’s foremost needs, if not the foremost need, as Marx himself claims in the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme. This is not to say that the extent to which self-determination is exercised 
and the corresponding degree of individual self-realization cannot vary. Indeed, the fact that 
they can vary is, I want to argue, what explains how freedom in the realm of necessity in 
communist society differs from freedom in the realm of ‘true’ freedom. What is more, Marx 
himself provides an account of the type of mechanism which might explain how the act of 
associating with others on purely instrumental grounds spontaneously loses its purely 
instrumental character to become valuable in itself in the following passage describing the 
associational form of life enjoyed by workers in France that he had observed:  
 
When communist workmen gather together [sich vereinen], their immediate aim is 
instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need – the need 
for society – and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical 
development can be most strikingly observed when one sees French socialist workers 
united [vereinigt]. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating 
links between people. Company, association [Verein], conversation, which in its turn 
has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow 
phrase, with them it is a truth, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their 
work-worn figures. (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 553-554; Marx 1992: 365; 
translation modified)  
 
This passage begins with individuals who initially associate with each other as a matter of 
practical necessity, in that they cannot otherwise realize certain ends that they have, not only 
as individuals but also as members of the same class, ends which in this particular case concern 
the common need to defend and further the interests they share as workers. This act of 
association based on individual and collective self-interest generates in time, however, a need 
to associate with others that is independent of the interests that first motivated each individual 
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to join forces with others with whom he or she shares certain interests. This need to associate 
with others cannot, therefore, be identified with these interests. Rather, the act of associating 
with others and the particular social activities that define this act is an independent need with 
an intrinsic value, in that the source of motivation for engaging in them is not to be identified 
with some pre-existing desire that each individual seeks to satisfy in a purely instrumental 
fashion. Since in the passage from the third volume of Capital that we are analysing Marx 
speaks of ‘socialized’ human beings, we must assume, in fact, that the workers have already 
developed this need to associate with others on non-instrumental grounds.10  
As argued above, the act of working can likewise come to possess an intrinsic value in 
virtue of how individuals, in association with others, engage in a common project that enables 
them to experience certain human goods that would not have been available to them 
independently of this act of association and engagement in a common project. This would 
overcome the alienation from other human beings that for Marx characterizes the capitalist 
mode of production. Moreover, since the workers exercise collective control over the 
productive forces and the process of production, they would no longer be at the mercy of 
impersonal economic and social forces and subject to the constraints that these forces generate 
in relation to their own wills. When this possibility is viewed in conjunction with the way in 
which the act of producing in association with others allows for the development of such 
distinctively human capacities as the power to deliberate and to exercise self-direction, it is no 
longer necessary to think of individual workers as being alienated from their productive activity 
or from their species-being. The workers would also no longer have to be regarded as alienated 
from the product of labour, for they would now have some control over the conditions under 
which objects are produced.  
To sum up the point that we have reached, there is now a situation in which the act of 
working may come to possess an intrinsic value at the same time as it occurs in the realm of 
necessity, in that individuals come to experience certain human goods that this act of 
association makes possible and that are therefore internal to the practice of engaging with 
others in a common project, rather than being goods to which the act of working serves merely 
as the means to an end, as when something is produced only with the intention to consume it. 
What is more, the act of production, now that it no longer has an alienated character and in 
virtue of the element of self-determination that it involves, allows individuals to exercise 
certain distinctively human capacities, and thereby to develop them in association with others. 
In this way, individuals enjoy expressive freedom through being able to realize their human 
essence, whereas this possibility does not exist in the realm of necessity as found in capitalist 
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society. Thus satisfaction can be found in the act of producing not only for oneself but also for 
others. This is not, however, because the act of producing in association with others serves 
some external goal which is realized by means of this act. Rather, it is because producing for 
others forms part of a common project in which individual self-realization goes hand in hand 
with the self-realization of others with whom and for whom one produces objects that satisfy 
human needs.  If, however, overcoming alienation is held to require that the object produced is 
itself in some way expressive of its creator in a personal sense through its possession of certain 
distinctive properties, what I have proposed is admittedly not sufficient to overcome 
alienation.11 Yet it extremely difficult to see how this requirement could be met in the case of 
the production of mass goods that is typical of a modern industrial economy, and when in 
communist society, even if what is produced is dictated by society’s needs, there would surely 
be many cases in which individuals would not, and could not, be involved in each and every 
stage of the production of one and the same object.  
It is precisely here that we begin to see why Marx would want to claim that it is only 
beyond the realm of necessity that the ‘true realm of freedom, the development of human 
powers as an end in itself’ exists, and that the shortening of the working day is the basic 
condition of this sphere of freedom. For it is only when human beings are freed from the 
constraints generated by the necessity of producing objects aimed at satisfying the material 
needs of society that they can dedicate themselves to genuinely personal projects. These 
projects do not, however, have to be purely arbitrary or solitary ones, and they may, therefore, 
generate their own constraints that concern the conditions of realizing these projects. The 
constraints in question will nevertheless be truly self-imposed ones in the sense that the needs 
of society do not require that individuals engage in the activities associated with a particular 
project or that a particular project is adopted in the first place.   
The explanation of the compatibility of freedom and constraint in the realm of necessity 
that I have offered rests on what I consider to be a defensible account of freedom and it does 
not require making controversial claims about the fulfilling nature of certain types of work. 
Nor does it rest on any strong essentialist assumptions.12 Any dismissal of Marx’s explanation 
of how necessity is compatible with freedom in a future communist society on such grounds as 
its ‘impracticality’ or that it would result in inefficiencies would itself require justification. 
This is because simply asserting such claims invites the response that what we have is simply 
a lack of imagination or the unwillingness to consider alternatives to the capitalist mode of 
production. Indeed, such claims might be viewed as little more than ideological attempts to 
close down debate about how to organize society with a view to maximizing the extent and the 
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quality of the freedom that human beings enjoy. In this respect claims of this kind correspond 
to the type of claim made by the ‘bourgeois consciousness’ that Marx criticizes for celebrating 
the division of the labour in the workshop while denouncing any attempt to control and regulate 
production socially as a violation of the rights of property, freedom and ‘the self-determining 
“genius” of the individual capitalist’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 377; Marx 1990: 477). 
In other words, although control and regulation of the production process on a social scale is 
summarily dismissed, the capitalist himself controls and regulates the labour process in his own 
factories and thereby through his own actions demonstrates that control and regulation of the 
production process is not, in fact, a practical impossibility. This performative contradiction, 
Marx suggests, is ultimately to be explained in terms of the private and class interests of the 
capitalist. This explanation of the compatibility of freedom and necessity nevertheless invites 
the following question. If the material needs of individuals and society could be met without 
people having to work, or by working far less than before, and individuals had the opportunity 
to give adequate expression to their distinctively human capacities and their social nature in 
other ways, would a reason for individuals to work any longer exist? In relation to this point, I 
shall now explore some implications of Marx’s analogy between how production will be 
organized in communist society and how an orchestra functions.  
On the one hand, let us assume that there is an orchestra made up of professional 
musicians, each and every one of which finds what they do fulfilling independently of the fact 
that it is how they earn a living, because engaging in the act of making music in association 
with other allows them to enjoy expressive freedom by exercising and developing certain 
distinctively human capacities in a way that accords with their social nature. Here it is not 
difficult to see how extrinsic and intrinsic forms of motivation perfectly coincide and how these 
musicians would, therefore, be motivated to engage in the same activity independently of the 
fact that it is a means of satisfying their material needs. On the other hand, let us assume the 
existence of a group of amateur musicians, for each of whom making music together before an 
audience is one of the greatest joys in life for the essentially the same reasons as in the previous 
case. These musicians are, however, less talented than the members of the professional 
orchestra, whose musical talent and accomplishments entitle them to a share of the social 
product.13 Consequently, the amateur musicians have to spend significant periods of their time 
operating machines, and, what is more, they find performing this activity to be a monotonous 
and unfulfilling one compared to the activity of making music together, even though they 
recognize the social necessity of what they do. This is not to say, however, that their 
involvement in the sphere of material production altogether denies them the opportunity to 
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exercise and develop the capacity for deliberation and self-direction through their direct 
involvement in the organization of the production process, nor the enjoyment of other human 
goods that are connected with the realization of one’s social nature. I think it is fair to say, 
however, that the coincidence of extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motivation is no longer so 
self-evident, and that these amateur musicians might well, therefore, choose not to labour if the 
option not to do so were available to them, and they could instead dedicate themselves to 
making music together for the benefit not only of themselves but also of others who enjoy 
hearing them play.14  
The fact that not everyone who wants to do so can, given the nature of things, be a 
professional musician, and that some human beings must continue to labour in the realm of 
necessity, means that the possibility of realizing oneself by playing an active, self-determining 
role in organizing the production process in association with others should nevertheless not be 
undervalued. This is especially the case if engaging in this type of activity to some extent 
facilitates self-realization and may come to possess an intrinsic value, if only of a limited kind. 
Rather, all three aspects of Marx’s concept of freedom would then be present in the realm of 
necessity, though not to the same extent as they are present in the ‘true’ realm of freedom. 
Indeed, if this were not the case, an essential difference between communist society and 
capitalist society would disappear. Moreover, Marx has a good reason for claiming that self-
realization, which depends on the exercise of the capacity for self-determination and the 
possibility of activities that possess an intrinsic value, must to some extent be possible even in 
the realm of necessity. This reason concerns the fact that individuals in communist society will 
typically be members of both the realm of necessity and the true realm of freedom. If an 
individual’s membership of the realm of necessity did not allow for the possibility of self-
determination, and thereby also excluded the possibility of self-realization and engagement in 
activities that possess some intrinsic value, a threat to the kind of freedom that characterizes 
the true realm of freedom would emerge. This threat concerns the way in which individuals 
would be potentially unprepared and not disposed to engage in activities that require the 
exercise of self-determination and to value the performance of certain activities for their own 
sake, as opposed to regarding these activities and other human beings involved in them simply 
as means to an end. Marx is himself keen to draw attention to how industrial labour under 
capitalism is incompatible with self-determination, and thus with self-realization and the 
possibility of activities that possess some kind of intrinsic value, in the following description 
of the effects of factory work:  
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Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the same time, it does 
away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, 
both in bodily and in intellectual activity. Even the lightening of the labour becomes an 
instrument of torture, since the machine does not free the worker from the work, but 
rather deprives the work itself of all content. (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 445-
446; Marx 1990: 548)  
 
Given this description of the effects of labour in capitalist society, and how workers are denied 
the opportunity to exercise self-determination, resulting in the absence of expressive freedom 
and the reduction of the act of working to something that possesses only instrumental value, 
the following question arises: will the leisure time available to people who work under such 
conditions not then take on a passive and purely instrument character by being reduced to a 
means of dealing with the effects of having to labour in such conditions? Instead of offering 
individuals the opportunity for self-realization and self-fulfilment, this leisure time may instead 
be spent engaged in activities that require little, if any, exercise of the capacity to be self-
determining and any other distinctively human capacities whose realization depends on the 
active employment of them. It would then be hard to see how the shortening of the working 
day would then be sufficient to open the way to the establishment of the ‘true realm of freedom’. 
The exercise of the capacity for self-determination within the realm of necessity through 
engagement in activities that possess some intrinsic value can therefore be seen as another 
condition of entry into this true realm of freedom.  
One does not have to be convinced by each and every aspect of Marx’s idea of 
communist society to appreciate the potential significance of what he says about how the realm 
of necessity in this society will differ from how it is in capitalist society. Rather, Marx helps 
clarify how the realm of necessity would need to be reformed to allow for greater individual 
self-realization through the actual exercise of the capacity for self-determination, thereby 
enabling people to discover an intrinsic value in the act of producing to meet society’s material 
needs in association with others. The task of clarifying this matter is surely an essential one for 
a society which proclaims that freedom and self-fulfilment are central elements of a truly 
human form of existence, but in which the organization of the production process is such that 
many people lack effective control over what they do and end up working merely to attain 
external ends, at the same time as there appears to be no obvious drive on the part of society in 
general to take advantage of technological advances to shorten the working day.15 
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1 See, for example, Kandiyali 2014, Klagge 1986 and Sayers 2011: 65-77. 
2 This notion of expressive freedom does not, as far as I can see, require locating Marx’s account of alienation and 
how it can be overcome within the larger narrative of an ‘expressivist’ tradition, as Charles Taylor suggests must 
be done when he associates Marx with a tradition that aspires to some kind of wholeness that demands the 
overcoming of division and a reconciliation of opposites through which human beings achieve self-expression 
(Taylor 1975: 546-551).  
3 Marx would not, therefore, regard the following case described by Hobbes as one that involves a voluntary act 
in any meaningful sense: ‘Feare, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for 
feare the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will’ (Hobbes 
1996: 146).   
4 Marx himself appears to argue that the needs associated with luxury goods are incompatible with true human 
interests because they generate relations of dependence that tend to result in the domination and exploitation of 
others. See Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 546-547; Marx 1992: 358-359. 
5 This understanding of negative freedom is found in Berlin 1958, where it is said to represent the only genuine 
idea of freedom, and we are warned not to confuse freedom with the lack of opportunity to do something because 
of economic or social causes. My point is that such causes can themselves be thought to involve conscious 
decisions and actions that result in interference with the lives of others.  
6 As it is in Cohen 1988: 258 
7 The capitalist class is, in fact, also subject to constraints in this regard. This is because the capitalist system 
depends on the existence of people who have only their labour to sell and have little choice but to sell it, so that 
although the existence of a wholly benevolent capitalist class is not inconceivable, its members could not 
collectively intend the freedom of each and every member of the proletariat, unless they intended at the same time 
to abolish the capitalist mode of production and thus the class to which they themselves belong. This helps explain 
Marx’s claim that a closer examination of social relations and conditions that are external to individuals, in the 
sense that these relations and conditions are determined by a system of exchange that operates independently of 
the wills of individuals, shows that ‘it is impossible for the individuals of a class etc. to overcome them en masse 
without destroying them. A particular individual may by chance get on top of these relations, but the mass of those 
under their rule cannot, since their mere existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the 
mass of individuals’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 42, 97; Marx 1993: 164).  
8 The importance of this form of freedom in Marx’s philosophy is stressed in Wood 2004: 50-52.  
9 To avoid the problematic idea that the full and free development of which Marx speaks requires that people in 
communist society engage in every possible activity, it has been claimed that what Marx in fact has in mind are 
different kinds of activities (Sayers 2011: 148-149). Already we can see how this requirement might be met, since 
in organizing production, as well as performing certain tasks within the production process, individuals would be 
able to engage both in intellectual and in manual forms of labour. 
10 Some account of how the workers have become socialized is also necessary when it comes to explaining Marx’s 
suggestion that the unalienated relations of workers to each other in communist society will be one in which each 
individual realizes him- or herself and affirms his or her species-being, not only by producing for others but also 
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by doing this in way that manifests a direct concern for their needs, rather than producing for others simply because 
this is a condition of getting them to produce for oneself. See Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 462; Marx 1992: 
277.  
11 This is not to say Marx does not make claims that suggest that this is indeed a requirement of the overcoming 
of alienation, as when he states the following about unalienated labour: ‘In my production I would have objectified 
the specific character of my individuality and for that reason I would both have enjoyed the expression of my own 
individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating the object, I would experience an individual pleasure, 
I would experience my personality as an objective sensuously perceptible power beyond all shadow of doubt’ 
(Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 40, 462; Marx 1992: 277). As we have seen, however, such claims can be explained 
in terms of the idea that by producing for others, as part of a collective project in which one determines in 
association with others the conditions under which production takes place, I enjoy a form of self-realization.  
12 The attempt has been made to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of alienation in a way that does not rest 
on any metaphysical, essentialist or perfectionist assumptions by focusing on certain purely formal requirements 
of free agency – especially how such agency presupposes the ability to make one’s own both that which one does 
and the conditions under which one does it - in abstraction from any particular conception of human nature or the 
good life and any other goals of willing (Jaeggi 2014). My argument does not require attributing to Marx a 
conception of human nature that extends beyond the capacity to exercise self-determination and the opportunity 
to exercise this capacity taken in conjunction with a claim about the essentially social nature of human beings. 
Thus, the argument that I have developed concerning the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist 
society accords with the claim that alienation can be understood to arise from an obstruction of the ‘positive’ 
freedom which consists in the capacity to exercise self-determination and the actual exercise of this capacity 
(Jaeggi 2014: 35). The major difference is that Marx applies this concept of alienation and what it would mean to 
overcome alienation to a particular domain of life, namely the sphere of material production, while arguing that 
overcoming alienation in this sphere requires establishing conditions appropriate to the human being’s essentially 
social nature. As regards the first difference, given the necessity of this sphere, it is surely valid to ask how 
alienation understood in the relevant sense can be overcome, or at least minimized, within the sphere of material 
production, whereas the refusal of any purely formal account of the concept of alienation to engage with this issue 
can be regarded as a weakness rather than an advantage of it. As regards the second difference, although the claim 
that human beings are essentially social beings can be challenged, to assume a more individualist standpoint 
invites an objection that Marx himself had already articulated, namely, that such a standpoint is the historical 
product of a certain mode of production and its relations of production (i.e. capitalism) (Marx and Engels 1956-
1990: 42, 19-20; Marx 1993: 84-84).  
13 Presumably, there will be orchestras in communist societies, whose members’ material needs must be satisfied 
by society. Given that the members of the orchestra will not be engaged in an activity that belongs to the realm of 
necessity, the question of whether they should not also play their part in this realm arises. Marx makes claims that 
could be interpreted to demand that they do, as when he states the following in relation to how the increase in 
productivity made possible by the capitalist mode of production allows for the shortening of the working day: 
‘The intensity and productivity of labour being given, the part of the social working day necessarily taken up with 
material production is shorter and, as a consequence, the time at society’s disposal for the free intellectual and 
social activity of the individual is greater, in proportion as work is more and more evenly divided among all the 
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able-bodied members of society, and a particular social stratum is more and more deprived of the ability to shift 
the burden of labour (which is a necessity imposed by nature) from its own shoulders to those of another social 
stratum’ (Marx and Engels 1956-1990: 23, 552; Marx 1990: 667). Since it is not clear how engaging in material 
labour would provide the members of the orchestra with opportunities for self-realization and self-determination 
that they would otherwise lack, the main reason for their doing so would have to be that this enables others to 
spend less time engaged in this form of labour. Arguably, however, this benefit would have certain costs, such as 
in this case lower musical standards, and it might therefore be argued that the benefits gained would be offset by 
the disadvantages. For example, some people might have more time to learn to play and to master a musical 
instrument, but they and unmusical people would at the same time risk having to attend concerts performed by 
sub-standard orchestras or solo performers, with the result that an important source of inspiration would be 
lacking, which may in turn have a negative effect on their own general musical development and on the esteem in 
which music-making is held in society.  
14 In this way the members of the group of amateur musicians would be able to realize themselves by producing 
for others but without engaging in material production. To claim that an element of self-realization would 
nevertheless be lacking requires showing that only material production, as opposed to aesthetic or cultural ways 
of producing for others, allows for self-realization in the relevant sense, and that participation in the realm of 
necessity is therefore a necessary condition of full self-realization. 
15 Proposals such as the one for a universal basic income might be seen to represent an important step in this 
direction. However, there are competing accounts of the level of income required and the reasons for it, some of 
which may be in the spirit of Marx’s claim that the working day must shortened to make possible and to expand 
the true realm of freedom, whereas others appeal to the desirability of reducing welfare payments and 
counterbalancing the tendency of employers to lower wages or salaries. The universal basic income can, in other 
words, function as a subsidy to employers, and far from increasing the bargaining power of workers, it would 
have to be set low enough to force people to work. For more details, see Le Monde diplomatique, ‘Le revenu 
garanti et ses faux amis’, July 2016. The last position is, of course, compatible with Marx’s views on the 
functioning of the realm of necessity in capitalist society. 
